Crime and Terrorism Risk by Kennedy Leslie W.;McGarrell Edmund F.;

Crime and Terrorism Risk by Kennedy Leslie W.;McGarrell Edmund F.;

Author:Kennedy, Leslie W.;McGarrell, Edmund F.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Group
Published: 2011-08-15T00:00:00+00:00


Challenges and Key Components

Perhaps the greatest challenge to implementing ILP is conceptual. The model of ILP presented herein is based on a broad conceptualization that views ILP as an overarching framework that builds on community policing, problem solving, and partnerships and takes an “all crimes” approach. Alternative conceptualizations may include viewing ILP as focused solely on homeland security and terrorism or following the UK model of ILP as involving the identification and targeting of high-rate, chronic offenders. Applying the model only to terrorism would be unfortunate because of terrorists’ involvement in such a wide variety of routine and preparatory crimes. Scholars studying ILP in the United Kingdom have noted the movement toward conceptual integration of ILP, community policing, problem solving, and partnerships but have also noted some of the inherent tensions of the styles of policing (Hale et al. 2004; Tilley 2003). For example, community policing calls for decentralized, geographic-based structure, but ILP is likely to include a centralized intelligence function.8 The danger, given the challenges of organizational change, is that integration of ILP, COP, POP, and partnerships results in a watered-down model whereby little meaningful change actually occurs (Hale et al. 2004). Despite these challenges and obstacles, there do appear to be identifiable components of what needs to occur for an integrated model of ILP to be implemented in a meaningful fashion.9 Zimmermann’s (2006) research, a series of case studies of high-performing PSN task forces (PSN case study cites) as well as organizational research (Morash & Ford, 2002), suggests several critical components for the implementation of ILP. Foremost is leadership. As noted above, organizational change is difficult and is unlikely absent commitment by the organizational leaders at the highest levels as well as those in key positions throughout the organization. ILP must be seen as a top priority and as something that is not going away. Such leadership is also essential to any hope of restructuring the organization in a way that allows for the integration of intelligence throughout the organization (Carter, 2004).

A second key ingredient is a multiunit, multiagency structure.10 Within the law enforcement agency, ILP cannot be seen as the sole province of an intelligence or crime analysis unit. Rather, it must be integrated throughout the organization. This is critical for both input into the intelligence process—as information held by street-level officers; gang, drug, vice, and major crime investigators; community policing officers; and others will form the basis of much intelligence analysis—and serving as key consumers of intelligence products (Riley et al. 2005). Beyond the single agency, a multiagency structure is essential, particularly in the United States, with its decentralized, fragmented law enforcement structure but also through the connections to other criminal justice agencies such as prosecutors, corrections officials (particularly gang and threat assessment units), probation and parole.11 For example, it was discussed earlier how tax code violations might be a trigger to more serious and violent crimes and that evidence exists that far-right extremists commit a large number of preparatory crimes, such as credit card fraud,



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